Researchers have scrutinized foreign aid's effects on poverty and growth, but anecdotal evidence suggests that donors often use aid for other ends. We test whether donors use bilateral aid to influence elections in developing countries. We find that recipient country administrations closely aligned with a donor receive more aid during election years, while those less aligned receive less. Consist with our interpretation, this effect holds only in competitive elections, is absent in U.S. aid flows to non-government entities, and is driven by bilateral alignment rather than incumbent characteristics.
Introduction
Since Boone (1994; 1996) reignited debate on the effectiveness of foreign aid, a large literature has examined its impacts on economic development. 1 This is an important agenda on normative grounds and eminently sensible: after all, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is by definition financing "with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective." (OECD, 2006) Might it nevertheless miss part of the story? Might donors also use aid for political change abroad?
The 2006 Palestinian elections suggest so. In these elections the U.S.-backed incumbent Palestinian Authority (P.A.) faced strong opposition from Hamas. In the weeks preceding the elections the United States Agency for International Development Assistance (USAID) funded several development programs in Palestine including the distribution of free food and water, a street-cleaning campaign, computers for community centers, and even a national youth soccer tournament. A progress report distributed to USAID and State Department officials was strikingly candid about the objective: "Public outreach is integrated into the design of each project to highlight the role of the P.A. in meeting citizens needs. The plan is to have events running every day of the coming week, beginning 13 January, such that there is a constant stream of announcements and public outreach about positive happenings all over Palestinian areas in the critical week before the elections." (Wilson and Kessler, 2006) This paper examines whether the Palestinian episode is indicative of a broader phenomenon: do donors use foreign aid to influence elections?
If so, the political cycles literature suggests that donors might adjust aid flows immediately before elections according to whether they favor the incumbent or not. We test this hypothesis using an empirical strategy analogous to differences-in-differences estimation: we compare aid flows in election and non-election years for recipient administrations that are more or less politically aligned with a donor. If donors do attempt to help more aligned administrations (or hamper less aligned ones) then we should see differentially higher aid flows in election years for more aligned administrations. Following Alesina and Dollar (2000) we use voting patterns at the United Nations to measure alignment between administrations. 2 We include donor-recipient fixed effects in all our models, and 1 E.g. Burnside and Dollar (2000) , Easterly et al. (2004) , Rajan and Subramanian (2005) , Rajan and Subramanian (2007) , and Werker and Cohen (2009) ; see Radelet (2006) or Rajan and Subramanian (2008) for overviews.
2 By using UN voting to measure alignment we do not necessarily mean to imply that aid is being exchanged for UN votes, though that interpretation is consistent with our results. Dreher et al. (2008) hence estimate election effects using only time variation within donor-recipient pairs.
We find that donors give significantly more aid in election years to recipient administrations that are more closely aligned. An administration that is two standard deviations more politically aligned with the donor receives $20 million more ODA on average during an election year as opposed to a non-election year, which is 35% of mean annual ODA level in our sample. The least aligned administrations experience a decrease in aid during election years: an administration one standard deviation below mean alignment receives $8 million less on average during an election year. On average aid is no higher during election years than non-election years, which suggests that donors and not recipients are responsible for political aid cycles.
We provide three additional pieces of evidence for the influence hypothesis. First, political aid cycles are driven by donor-specific alignment rather than alignment with the "average" donor, confirming that bilateral politics is the key driver. Second, political aid cycles are concentrated in competitive elections, as one would expect if donors are more likely to intervene when the stakes are higher. Third, U.S. funding to nongovernmental and opposition groups exhibits (statistically insignificant) political cycles opposite to those in ODA, consistent with the influence hypothesis but inconsistent with omitted variables interpretations. The Appendix shows that our results are also robust to using aid disbursements v.s. commitments, to dropping the largest aid recipients, to controlling directly for outliers, and to focusing on elections that take place later in the calendar year.
Our findings add to work on aid's determinants, which has shown that aid allocations are strongly correlated with measures of political alignment. 3 Along with Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Dreher and Jensen (2007) this paper provides evidence that politics plays a causal role. This point has further implications for the aid effectiveness literature, which has built on the determinants literature by using political variables as instruments for aid. The assumption implicit in this strategy is that politics affects how aid is allocated but not how it is used. Our results raise the question of whether intent matters -that is, whether aid given for political ends has different impacts than aid given purely to promote development. 4 They also imply that selecting leaders may be an important channel through which aid influences development. 5
Our analysis also fits within work on political cycles more generally, which has docupresent evidence that US aid is used to buy UN votes without specific reference to elections. 3 E.g. Alesina and Dollar (2000) , Neumayer (2002) , Barro and Lee (2005) mented a pattern of fiscal expansion prior to elections in developing countries. 6 Several of the explanations proposed for this pattern may also explain our results -voters may naively "vote their pocketbooks" or may infer candidate quality from social spending (Rogoff, 1990) . Alternatively, changes in aid flows may signal the strength of the incumbent's relationship with the donor. As for impacts, there is some evidence that fiscal policy affects voting, though valid instruments are scarce. 7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our data sources and Section 3 our empirical methodology. In Section 4 we present the main results along with robustness checks and extensions; the Appendix presents additional robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes.
Data Sources
Our source for ODA figures is the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate Table A .2). We consider only bilateral donors, since multilateral donors have multiple stakeholders making it difficult to define donor-recipient alignment. We focus on the five largest donors during the study period (the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) who together accounted for 77% of aid commitments. This gives us a 30-year panel with 116 recipients in total and an average of 102 recipients per donor-year. 8 It is important to note that ODA as defined by the DAC must meet three criteria: it must be "(a) undertaken by the official sector (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element of at least 25 per cent]" (OECD, 2006) . ODA does not include grants, loans and credit for military purposes or transfer payments to private individuals.
6 E.g. Schuknecht (1996) , Alesina et al. (1999) , Drazen (2000) , Schuknecht (2000) , Franzese (2002) , and Shi and Svensson (2003) . Brender and Drazen (2005) argue that cycles are concentrated in new democracies. 7 Using neighboring districts as instruments, Levitt and Snyder (1997) find that federal spending helps incumbent Congressmen in the U.S.; Brender and Drazen (2008) estimate that larger deficits hurt rather than help incumbents internationally. In our context, incumbent political alignment is a poor instrument since it likely affects voting through channels other than aid. 8 We exclude from the analysis recipients with gaps in key time series (elections and UN votes) as including them would cloud the interpretation of fixed-effects estimators. Such gaps generally reflect internal strife (e.g., Iraq, Somalia) or other important transformations in the country which would affect both political alliances and aid levels. Where we introduce additional variables we again drop any pairs for whom we do not observe all variables in an unbroken sequence.
To account for the possibility that some aid is specifically intended to facilitate elections we incorporate data from the DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which presents ODA statistics broken down by purpose. The database is incomplete and includes only a fraction of the ODA in the DAC database; OECD representatives claim it is a random subsample of the DAC data but cannot account for specific differences. We nonetheless use the data to subtract aid directed towards "elections" and "government administration" (sector codes 15161 and 15140) from our outcome variables in order to be sure that there is nothing mechanical driving our results. Of course, since our goal is to estimate differential election year effects by political alignment, election-facilitating aid is a priori unlikely to affect the results. In practice, the excluded aid makes up only 1% of total CRS aid and whether we include or exclude it has essentially no impact on the results. The mean probability of an election occurring in any particular recipient-year is 8.9%
and increases by 0.2% per year after controlling for recipient fixed-effects (not reported).
The DPI also includes information on the election outcomes and an index of electoral competitiveness which we describe in Section 4 where we differentiate our results by the competitiveness of elections. 9
Our measure of political alignment is the fraction of UN General Assembly votes in which both countries voted (either yes or no) for which their votes coincided. Any vote for which a country was absent, abstained, or was not a member of the UN is not counted in its total. We calculate this fraction for every donor-recipient-year observation and use the average of this variable over each recipient administration's term in office as our measure of alignment. This aggregation does not distinguish between more and less important votes, but we were unable to systematically improve upon it since donors likely differ in the importance they attach to specific votes. General Assembly voting records are taken 
Empirical Methodology
Let d index donor countries, r index recipient countries, and t index years. We first estimate the direct relationship between bilateral aid and elections:
Here ELEC rt is an indicator which takes the value 1 if recipient r held an election for the chief executive office in year t, X drt is a vector of time-varying donor or recipient-specific control variables such as population and GDP, and α dr represents a vector of donorrecipient fixed effects. In this specification δ 1 represents the average effect of elections on aid flows. Our donor influence hypothesis does not predict anything particular about δ 1 :
in some cases a donor may wish to support an incumbent by increasing aid flows, while in others the donor may seek to hurt an incumbent's electoral chances by restricting aid flows, and δ 1 averages together these offsetting effects.
There are, however, several other reasons why one might expect aid to be systematically different in election years. First, elections could alter aid's effectiveness. Media scrutiny might be higher and electoral discipline stronger, leading to more effective use of funds; alternatively, incentives for corruption might be stronger because of the need to finance campaigns or because of shortened time horizons, leading to less effective use of funds. Election years might also be more prone to civil unrest and internal conflict, which could either attract or deter aid. Second, elections might be endogenously timed in some countries. Politicians with discretion over the timing of elections may schedule them to coincide with periods of strong economic performance in order to increase their chances of reelection (Ito, 1990) . They might also aim to hold elections at times when aid inflows were high. If so we should see a positive relationship between elections and aid. Finally, aid might increase during election years because recipients intensify their requests for aid in hopes of boosting their electoral prospects. This view is similar to our influence hypothesis in that aid is used to influence elections, but distinct in that incumbent leaders rather than donors have agency. A key distinguishing feature of this view is that aid should only increase and not decrease during election years, since incumbents would never request aid reductions. We estimate Equation 1 as an omnibus test of these hypotheses.
One statistical concern is that elections may be correlated with unobserved recipient characteristics -for example, well-governed countries might hold elections more frequently and also receive more aid. We address this possibility by including donor-recipient fixed effects (the α dr s) in Equation 1. This eliminates any time-invariant attributes of recipients and of their bilateral relationships with donors, leaving only time variation within donorrecipient pairs with which to estimate election effects. Another concern is that trends in aid have mirrored trends in election frequency. To control for this possibility we include, alternately, year fixed effects, donor-year fixed effects, and time-varying controls such as population and GDP.
After estimating (1) we move to our main question: do donors provide differentially more aid in election years to recipient administrations with which they are more politically aligned? Donors might engage in this behavior if changes in aid flows could affect election results. There are several channels through which this effect could operate. It could be that increases in aid allow a government to increase visible social spending (e.g., distribution of free food, employment and public works programs) as in the Palestinian anecdote in the Introduction. Social spending might directly influence voters beliefs about the candidate, or indirectly by signaling something about candidate quality (Rogoff, 1990 ).
Incumbents may also be able to use public funds to directly finance campaign activities, or inflows of aid might signal levels of foreign support for the incumbent government.
Regardless of the exact mechanism, we expect increased aid to improve an incumbent's chances of winning re-election, while reductions in aid would harm these chances. 10
To test the influence hypothesis we estimate
Here U N drt is our measure of political alignment between the donor d and recipient r at time t, which captures average alignment over the recipient administration's previous 10 Levitt and Snyder (1997) show that election-year spending helps incumbent U.S. Congressmen. Brender and Drazen (2008) show that larger deficits are associated with lower re-election probabilities in a large sample of countries; this supports our hypothesis to the extent that aid substitutes for deficits, but of course aid can also be turned into spending without affecting deficits. More broadly, a growing literature has documented that voters do not perfectly disentangle politician performance from exogenous shocks (Achen term in office. Intuitively, δ 3 estimates the differences-in-differences between election year effects for more and less politically aligned regimes. This identification strategy allows for unobserved factors that covary with both aid and elections (e.g., conflict and efficiency of aid spending, as discussed above) provided they do not do so differentially by political alignment. It also directly addresses concerns about election endogeneity: in order for endogenous election timing to bias estimates of this specification, more closely aligned governments would need to be more (or less) likely to shift elections toward such years.
We include the same battery of time-varying controls as above.
A final methodological issue concerns inference. Even after removing donor-recipient and time fixed effects the error terms in (1) and (2) are unlikely to be conditionally uncorrelated within dimensions of the panel, as is necessary for consistency of the usual OLS standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004; Petersen, 2005) . Since there are several possible dimensions on which to cluster we use the most general approach, non-nested multi-way clustering along each of the three dimensions of the panel (donors, recipients, and years) as proposed by Cameron et al. (2006) . The only restriction this imposes is that Cov( drt , esu ) = 0 for d = e, r = s, t = u. While we prefer this approach for its robustness, our results are also significant when we use more restrictive approaches, e.g.
clustering on donor-recipient pairs to allow for autocorrelation.
Results

Is There an Election Year Effect?
We first test whether there are election-year aid shocks in recipient countries. Columns I-III of zero. This is true whether we control for time-varying influences using year fixed effects (Column I), donor-year fixed effects (Column II), or macroeconomic controls (Column III). Moreover, this does not seem to be due to a lack of power: the magnitudes within a 95% confidence interval are still only on the order of $10 million.
The absence of a relationship between mean aid flows and election years increases our confidence that the differential effects we document below are not driven by omitted variable bias. Any variables correlated with election timing that affect aid decisions, such as domestic conflict, would have shown up in these regressions. The non-result is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that politicians systematically time elections to coincide with large inflows of aid; this accords with the existing literature, which has not found strong evidence of endogenous timing (Alesina et al., 1999) . Finally, it is inconsistent with the view that recipients proactively request more aid during election years and donors passively respond.
Is There a Differential Election Year Effect by Political
Alignment?
We now turn to our main question: do ODA flows change differentially in election years for recipient administrations that are more and less aligned with the donor. Columns IV-VI of Table 3 For example, an administration one standard deviation below the mean level of donoralignment receives $8 million less on average during an election year. In contrast, an administration one standard deviation above the mean receives $12 million more during an election year.
The fact that less aligned administrations receive less aid during election years is particularly important as it is incompatible with the idea that recipients themselves drive the observed patterns: one would have to believe that less aligned administrations request a decrease in aid during election years. Similarly, endogenous timing is an unlikely explanation: one would have to believe that less-aligned governments systematically choose low-aid years in which to hold elections.
Regarding robustness, Columns V and VI show that the results hold up when we include donor-year fixed effects or macroeconomic controls; they are also robust to recipientspecific trends (not reported). The Appendix shows that political cycles are more pronounced for elections that take place in the latter half of the calendar year and insignificant for elections that take place in the first three months of the year, confirming that our results are driven by aid before rather than after elections. The Appendix also reports checks for the influence of outliers. In brief, the results are robust to (a) controlling for individual outlier observations, (b) dropping the larger aid recipients, and (c) using aid disbursements rather than commitments as the dependent variable. We implement a test as follows:
which is common to all donors and the residual U N drt = U N drt − U N rt which is donor-specific. Intuitively, if political aid cycles are driven by recipient-level characteristics then we should find that they are predicted by the common component of UN votes, while if bilateral politics are key then the donor-specific component should drive the results. We estimate
Columns VII-IX of Table 3 present the results. We find that aid cycles are driven entirely by the idiosyncratic, donor-specific component of UN alignment; the election-year coefficient on the common component is small and statistically insignificant. This suggests that aid cycles are indeed about bilateral politics and not a concerted effort by donors to select particular kinds of leaders for recipient countries.
Are The Effects Stronger in Closer Elections?
We next differentiate elections by how readily a donor could influence them, proxying for ease of influence with measures of competitiveness. The motivating idea is that changes in aid flows are more likely to influence an election that is hanging in the balance that one that is a foregone conclusion. To test this formally we allow for distinct political cycles around non-competitive elections (indicated by N ON COM P rt ) and competitive ones (indicated by 1 − N ON COM P rt ):
Here δ 4 and δ 5 measure political cycles around competitive elections, while δ 6 and δ 7 measure those around non-competitive ones. We predict the former pair to be large and the latter pair small.
We use two complementary proxies for the competitiveness of an election. The first characterizes an election as noncompetitive if the winner received more than 75% of the votes. We observe this measure for 225 elections, of which 73 are defined as noncompetitive. For example, the 1996 presidential election in Zimbabwe in which Robert Mugabe received a commanding 93% of the vote is characterized as noncompetitive. This outcome might reflect either overwhelming support for Mugabe or electoral fraud; in either case we expect that this election would have been difficult for a donor to influence.
The vote-share approach has several limitations. One is availability: we observe voting outcomes for only 64 of the 71 aid-receiving countries that held elections, and of course for none of those that did not. A second is potential endogeneity: if variation in ODA affects which elections have a winner with more than 75% of the vote then our estimates would be biased (though the sign of the bias is unclear). Though we believe that setting the threshold at 75% minimizes this possibility, we cannot rule it out. To compensate for these limitations we also introduce a second proxy for competitiveness: an indicator for whether multiple parties are illegal at the time of the election. We derive this from the DPI's Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC) (Beck et al., 2005) . This is an objective measure of political competition, available for all 274 elections in our sample (105 of which it categorizes as non-competitive) as well as for for aid-receiving countries that did not hold executive elections, and not subject to the endogeneity bias discussed above. The obvious drawback is that it captures only one aspect of competitiveness -there are surely elections in our sample in which multiple parties were legal and yet the outcome was never in doubt. The EIEC measure and the voting measure of noncompetitiveness are positively correlated but the magnitude of the correlation is only 0.50, suggesting that they do contain different information.
The first three columns of Table 4 present results using the vote-based measure of competitiveness. For competitive elections our point estimates again indicate a political aid cycle, smaller in magnitude but highly significant. 11 For non-competitive elections, however, there is no evidence of a cycle at all. This contrast becomes even sharper when we use the EIEC-based measure of competitiveness in Columns IV-VI. We find a large and strongly significant aid cycle around competitive elections, but no cycle around non-competitive ones. These results support the joint hypothesis that donors use aid to influence elections and that the expected returns to doing so are greater in more competitive elections.
Are there Cycles in Aid Flows to NGOs?
Our analysis thus far has focused exclusively on ODA flows, which originate with donor governments and benefit recipient governments. But some donors also give money to non-governmental entities in developing countries. Testing for political cycles in these aid flows is interesting for two reasons. First, it serves as a placebo test: if our ODA results were driven by some omitted variable affecting the desirability of sending aid then we would expect to see analogous cycles in aid to non-governmental groups. Second, if some of the non-governmental groups who receive foreign aid are in fact part of the political opposition then our influence hypothesis predicts an opposite political cycle in their funding.
Unfortunately we do not have systematic data on support from donors to non-governmental groups in developing countries. However, we did obtain data on funds channeled through the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy. Congress established the NED in 1983 at President Reagan's request to promote democracy abroad, and it continues to receive over We obtained data on all NED grants from 1990 to 2005 including amounts, years, and recipient countries. In Table 5 we report estimates of Equation 2 using NED flows as our new outcome variable, with results for U.S. ODA over the same time period in Column IV for comparison (note that ODA flows greatly exceed NED grantmaking, explaining the difference in magnitude of the coefficients). While the NED estimates are not significant they point in the opposite direction as those for ODA flows: NED aid is higher in election years when UN votes is low, and lower when UN votes is high. This is consistent with the influence hypothesis but inconsistent with omitted variables interpretations of our earlier results.
Conclusion
This paper argues that donor countries use ODA to influence the outcome of foreign elections. During election years, donor countries increase ODA to recipient administrations that are politically aligned with them and reduce ODA to less aligned administra- 
A.1 Timing Concerns
One limitation of our data is that we observe both elections and aid flows at the annual level. This raises a question whether the relationship between aid and UN alignment during election years is driven by aid before or after the election itself takes place. The
Palestinian anecdote cited in the Introduction and our own conversations with former USAID officials suggest that donors can implement new aid packages fairly quickly before an election if they desire, but it is desirable to examine the issue more systematically.
Specifications Exploiting Election Timing. One way we can examine this issue is to exploit information on the timing of elections, which is available for 268 out of the 274 elections in our sample. If aid cycles were driven by changes in aid following elections we would expect to see stronger effects for earlier elections, while our influence hypothesis predicts stronger effects in later elections. Table A .1 reports results differentiated by election timing. In the first column we define an election as "early" if it took place in the first six months of the year (the median election takes place in July). We estimate larger aid cycles for elections that take place later in the year, but economically and statistically significant cycles around early elections as well. In the next column we redefine "early"
to mean taking place in the first three months of the year; using that definition we again estimate a large and significant effect of later elections but now estimate a small and insignificant cycle for early elections.
Specifications Using Aid Disbursements. Our primary estimates of political aid cycles use aid commitments as the outcome variable, but we could alternatively have used aid disbursements, which are recorded separately in the DAC database. The quantitative gap between commitments and disbursements is not large in our sample (mean disbursements are $50 million, as opposed to mean commitments of $57 million), but the difference in the timing of commitments and disbursements could be important depending on the nature of political aid cycles. If one believes that donors are signalling support for an incumbent then commitments are appropriate (especially since we know that they are not binding). If, on the other hand, one thinks that fiscal policy is the key mechanism then either commitments or disbursements might be appropriate depending on the incumbent's ability to spend future income. To examine this issue we re-ran our main estimators using aid disbursements rather than commitments as the outcome variable. The results are reported in Tables A.2 and A.3. Estimated political cycles in aid disbursements are smaller than estimated cycles in commitments, but they remain economically and statistically significant. are not driven by these observations we re-ran our main specification including a separate indicator variable for each of these three observations, effectively dropping them from the regression. Table A .5 reports the results; dropping these outliers reduces the estimated magnitude of aid cycles but they remain economically and statistically significant.
A.2 Robustness to Outliers
Dropping Large
Recipients. An alternative notion of robustness is sensitivity to large aid recipients. Tables A.6 and A.7 report estimates of our main specifications for samples that exclude the largest 3 recipients (Egypt, Indonesia, India) and largest 5 recipients (Egypt, Indonesia, India, Israel, China) in our sample, respectively. The estimates in Table A .6 are smaller in magnitude but qualitatively similar and in fact more strongly significant than baseline estimates. Estimates in Table A .7 are again somewhat smaller in magnitude but remain qualitatively consistent with baseline estimates and statistically significant (in some cases at the 10% level). 12
Estimates Using Ln(ODA) as the Dependent Variable. An alternative way to reduce the weight given to larger aid recipients is to estimates specifications using the logarithm of ODA as the dependent variable. A priori it is unclear whether estimation in logs or in levels is more appropriate. Suppose the optimal amount of aid given to recipient r during "normal" years is n r while the magnitude of the "adjustment" in aid 12 We also estimated models dropping each individual recipient one-at-a-time. None of the exclusions has a material effect on the results except excluding Egypt; excluding Egypt yields estimates similar to those in flows a donor wishes to make prior to an election in recipient r is e r . If cross-recipient variation in these figures is proportionate -i.e. if e r = kn r for some constant k -then a logarithmic specification is appropriate. On the other hand if e r is independent of n r then a linear model is appropriate. It is thus an empirical question which specification better fits the data.
An additional issue that arises when fitting models for log ODA is that aid flows are strictly positive for only 90% of the donor-recipient-year observations in our sample.
Following Kuziemko & Werker (2006) we set ODA to $1 for the remaining observations and then take natural logarithms.Demeaned ODANon−Election Year Election Year Outlier 
